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For much of the nation’s history, the criminal jury has enjoyed an
iconic role in the American justice system. In Duncan v. Louisiana,
Justice Byron White described the criminal jury as a protection
against arbitrary rule that had been recognized as an essential
safeguard of individual liberty since the founding of the nation.1 But
White also acknowledged the existence of a longstanding debate
about the wisdom of “permitting untrained laymen to determine the
facts in civil and criminal proceedings.”2 He intimated that those
criticisms may be even stronger with respect to the competence of
civil jurors to understand evidence and to decide cases fairly and
predictably. Such criticisms dated back to the Founding, and the
debate between Federalists and anti-Federalists over the Seventh
Amendment’s guarantee of a jury in civil cases. 
More than two hundred years later, the debate over the role of the
civil jury continues unabated. But even as questions about the civil
jury’s competence as an adjudicative institution continue, questions
surrounding the civil jury’s justification and role as a political
institution are underexplored.
To explore these questions in contemporary society, the Bill of
Rights Institute and Law Review at William & Mary Law School
hosted a symposium on The Civil Jury as a Political Institution. For
two days in February 2013, scholars from an array of disciplines
gathered to consider the extent to which the civil jury played a
meaningful role as a political institution historically, whether it still
serves that purpose today and, if so, what measures can or should
be taken to ensure its continuing significance. This issue of the
William & Mary Law Review is the compilation of papers that
formed the basis for that discussion.
Robert Burns’ contribution is a useful place to start, as he
interrogates what we might mean when we say that the civil jury is
a “political institution.”3 For Burns, the jury is a political institution
in part because each juror—and then the jury collectively—is
“taking public action through public institutions” and in choosing
1. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).  The Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to an “impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed” applied to
defendants charged with criminal offenses in state courts. Id. at 156.
2. Id. at 157.
3. Robert P. Burns, The Jury As a Political Institution: An Internal Perspective, 55 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 805 (2014).
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one narrative over another, is determining “his own public identity
and the identity of his community.”4 In rendering a verdict, juries
act politically by implicitly understanding their task as the
“reconstitution of a common project and the establishment of a
public identity.”5 It is also a political institution because it allows
and encourages a “multiplicity of perspectives.”6 Finally, Burns sees
the jury as political in the sense that it is balancing competing
values—political, moral, and legal—in a particular case.7 In this
way, the jury can decide to elevate their own “common sense
political and moral judgment” above the “law of rules.”8 
With Burns’ framing in mind, three distinct themes emerged from
the Symposium papers: the jury as locus of popular sovereignty;
differing conceptions of the role of individual jurors; and the tension
between community or justice values, and rule-of-law values. 
A. The Jury as Locus of Popular Sovereignty
For Akhil Amar, the jury was the locus of popular sover-
eignty—lay control over governance—from the time of the
Founding,9 and this historical pedigree remains a compelling
justification for the jury's role.10 Amar encourages us to see the civil
jury as part of a larger family of juries, including the grand jury and
criminal petit jury.11 By looking at the grand jury, which hears
several cases at once, we see that the civil jury may be disadvan-
taged institutionally versus the judiciary by the fact that it only sees
one case at the time.12 Amar draws the analogy between the jury
and the House of Representatives as the “lower house” in their
respective branch of government.13
Amar also points to the criminal jury’s role as a tool to prevent
government oppression, and suggests that the jury is particularly
4. Id. at 825.
5. Id. at 811.
6. Id. at 824.
7. Id. at 811.
8. Id. at 818.
9. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998).
10. Akhil Reed Amar, Opening Remarks, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 729 (2014).
11. Id. at 730.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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important in civil cases involving “man against the government.”14
Meanwhile, we might consider, says Amar, whether the
nonunanimous verdicts in civil cases could also work on the criminal
side.15 Finally, he points out that we think of jury duty and voting
rights, but what about a duty to vote?16 Indeed, we might decide that
voters have a duty to listen to different sources of information and
deliberate over their choice, just as we now require of jurors.17
Alexandra Lahav sees this popular-sovereignty justification as
important as well, and particularly emphasizes the Tocquevillian
theme of educating citizens in self-governance.18 For Lahav, “The
best argument in favor of juries in a pluralist republic such as our
own is not that jurors make better decisions than other actors, but
that citizens are the ones making the decisions.”19
Jury service exposes citizens to the inner workings of the courts
and places them in a position of power within the court system.20
According to Lahav, “The value of observation is educational; the
value of participation is dignitary.”21 When judges grab power for
themselves, one risk is corruption or bias in favor of government;
another risk is simply unwarranted confidence in the accuracy of
their own decision-making skills.22 Lahav suggests that perhaps
juries favor individuals over institutions, which might counterbal-
ance the fact that institutions have greater resources, or are repeat
players.23
William Nelson and Suja Thomas draw on history to argue for
particular roles for the jury that are worth preserving. Nelson points
to the civil jury as the appropriate adjudicative body to make
informed decisions on politically sensitive issues.24 Indeed, Nelson
14. Id. at 733.
15. Id. at 734.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 735-36.
18. Alexandra D. Lahav, The Jury and Participatory Democracy, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1029 (2014); see also ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, WHY JURY DUTY MATTERS: A CITIZEN’S
GUIDE TO CONSTITUTIONAL ACTION (2012).
19. Lahav, supra note 18, at 1031-32.
20. Id. at 1035.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1041.
23. Id. at 1050-51.
24. William E. Nelson, Political Decision Making by Informed Juries, 55 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1149 (2014).
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argues that legislators and judges “affirmatively delegate political
power to juries.”25 Nelson recounted how judges had historically
relied on juries to head off criticism of bias or self-interested
judgments in cases that required the application of “political
morality” rather than strict legal rules.26 According to Nelson,
judges lack the “democratic pedigree” necessary to inspire confi-
dence in their ability to reflect community values in tough cases
regardless of whether they are appointed or elected to the bench.27
Juries, by contrast, are insulated from charges of favoring powerful
political interests because they are drawn randomly from the
community, and the verdict reflects a consensus view.28
The key to the jury’s ability to fulfill this role, Nelson argues, is
access to complete and accurate information about the various
factors that might affect their decision.29 Nelson compares the
outcomes in Erving v. Craddock, a 1761 civil case out of Massachu-
setts in which the jury was fully informed about the law and facts,
with Arizona v. May, in which the jury was likely confused about the
consequences of convicting the defendant of sexual molestation, and
he received a seventy-five-year sentence.30 In Nelson’s view, this
comparison illustrates how juries that are able to draw on informa-
tion about the likely consequences of their decision will be able to
render fair and legitimate verdicts, while juries that are deprived of
relevant information will ultimately fail to do so.31 And for Nelson,
there is no necessary tension between political and legal judgments;
rather, there are “inevitably political judgments that are required
in applying preexisting rules of law to the facts of particular
cases.”32 Nelson’s argument is that well-informed juries, rather than
judges, are the ones to make such judgments.33
Whereas Nelson supports the practice of judges submitting cases
involving sensitive political issues to the jury, other Symposium
participants were more skeptical of (at least some parts of) the
25. Id. at 1150.
26. Id. at 1154.
27. Id. at 1162.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1163.
30. Id. at 1156-60.
31. Id. at 1160-61.
32. Id. at 1163-64.
33. Id. at 1164.
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judiciary’s intentions toward the civil jury. In his keynote address,
Senator Sheldon Whitehouse argued that a number of decisions by
the United States Supreme Court in recent years have substantially
restricted the role of the civil jury.34 In particular, he pointed to the
interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act in Rent-a-Center v.
Jackson and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, restrictions on class
certification in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and the elevation of predictabil-
ity for corporate financial interests over the finality of damage
awards guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment in Exxon v. Baker
as examples of the Court usurping the power of civil juries to benefit
politically powerful interests.35
For Whitehouse, the civil jury is a valuable political institution
for guarding against “judicial autocracy” as well as distributing
power to the people.36 Whitehouse sees juries as a check against the
potential of judicial bias, as well as a way to make sure that
businesses are held accountable.37 He sees the civil jury as a
structural part of our government, “vest[ing] citizens with direct and
substantial authority” in adjudicating disputes.38 This grant of
authority, Whitehouse says, is important so that there is an
institution that is “separate from the prevailing structure of
power.”39 As he puts it, “[O]ne last sanctuary remains: the hard
square corners of the jury box stand firm against the tide of
influence and money.”40
Suja Thomas likewise laments the diminution of Seventh
Amendment protections on the civil jury’s authority by the more
entrenched branches of government.41 Under common law, judges
had relatively few opportunities to curtail litigants’ rights to a jury
trial.42 Over the course of the past century, however, she notes that
the executive branch has increasingly augmented the jurisdiction of
34. Sheldon Whitehouse, Restoring the Civil Jury’s Role in the Structure of Our
Government, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1241 (2014).
35. Id. at 1259, 1267, 1264.
36. Id. at 1266-72.
37. Id. at 1254-55, 1266.
38. Id. at 1271.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Suja A. Thomas, Blackstone’s Curse: The Fall of the Criminal, Civil, and Grand Juries
and the Rise of the Executive, the Legislature, the Judiciary, and the States, 55 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1195 (2014).
42. Id. at 1209-11.
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administrative agencies, often placing procedural hurdles in the way
of litigants seeking justice from the civil jury.43 And the legislative
branch has also enacted caps on damage awards that limit the
practical impact—Thomas argues—of the jury’s ability to send a
message about standards of conduct for the community.44
Thomas also accuses the Supreme Court of interfering with civil
litigants’ rights to have a jury decide their cases: by permitting
judges to determine the plausibility of litigants’ claims as articu-
lated in the pleadings, and to substitute their own judgments as to
the appropriate amount of a damage award.45 Finally, by not
incorporating the Seventh Amendment guarantees against the
States, the Supreme Court has permitted the same types of
executive, legislative, and judicial encroachments to take place in
state courts as well as federal courts.46 The irony of all this for
Thomas is that the jury was originally intended as a check against
these other institutions.47
B. Conceptions of the Juror’s Role
Another theme was different conceptions of the role of individual
jurors. Put differently, how should jurors conceive of their role in a
civil case?
For Leib et al., jurors ought think of themselves as fiduciaries.48
Drawing on private law, Leib argues that fiduciaries are people who
act on behalf of others, have their trust, and protect their vulnera-
bility.49 In this context, the populace essentially chooses jurors at
random and trusts them to adjudicate civil disputes, and people are
vulnerable to these jurors because they can be subject to their
decisions, whether as a party in a case or because they must
conform their primary conduct to the norms articulated and
43. Id. at 1235.
44. Id. at 1236-37.
45. Id. at 1237.
46. Id. at 1238.
47. Id. at 1239.
48. Ethan J. Leib et al., Fiduciary Principles and the Jury, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1109
(2014).
49. Id. at 1113-14.
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enforced by juries.50 As fiduciaries, jurors should act on behalf of
their fellow citizens in making decisions.51 
For Landsman, jurors are a “regulator of last resort” in certain
kinds of cases in which the political process has failed to protect the
interests of ordinary people.52 The civil jury, in Landsman's account,
is in some sense its own administrative agency—perhaps even a
mini-legislature or state attorney general—safeguarding the
interests of consumers because financial interests have captured the
existing institutions.53 Here, he echoes the populist view of Sen.
Whitehouse.
Landsman recounts how in a series of cases in California, civil
juries found insurers liable for intentionally delaying claims
payments or placing their own financial interests over those of
customers, and the juries assessed substantial damages.54 These
verdicts served to put insurers on notice of the reach of common law
in setting standards for acceptable behavior even when federal and
state regulatory bodies charged with overseeing insurance carriers
failed to do so.55
For Diamond, Rose, and Murphy, an important subset of jurors
are actually best thought of as experts “embedded” in the jury.56
This is, of course, a quite counterintuitive claim because we
normally think of jurors as the opposite of experts—generalists, or
worse. 
But Diamond, Rose, and Murphy present empirical evidence that
with the decline of automatic occupational exemptions, a significant
subset of jurors are actually experts in the subject matter involved
in the case—nurses, engineers, etc.57 And Diamond, Rose, and
Murphy think this is a positive development in our justice system.58
Their empirical evidence suggests that in the aggregate, “expert-
50. Id. at 1131-32.
51. Id. at 1138.
52. Stephan Landsman, Juries As Regulators of Last Resort, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1061
(2014).
53. Id. at 1064.
54. Id. at 1076-88.
55. Id. at 1093.
56. Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose & Beth Murphy, Embedded Experts on Real
Juries: A Delicate Balance, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 885 (2014).
57. Id. at 905-06.
58. Id. at 930-33.
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jurors as a whole” are less likely to take a one-sided view of the
evidence than other jurors.59
Under existing law, it is unclear and varies among jurisdictions
whether this expertise can be used during juror deliberations.60 But
if these jurors were recognized and embraced as experts in this way,
though with appropriate cautions from the judge, this might carry
important implications for deliberations on the jury, instructions
given by the judge, and even jury selection itself.
C. Injecting Community or Justice Values
Across virtually all of the Symposium discussions was recognition
of the tension between the view that the civil jury operates as a
political institution by interjecting community views of justice and
fairness into the judicial process, and the view that justice under the
rule of law implies that outcomes in like cases will be the same. 
Jeffrey Abramson confronts this dilemma in a rebuttal to Heather
Gerken’s interesting essay on second-order diversity.61 He explains
that first-order diversity, in which the jury fairly reflects the
diversity of the community, permits the jury to fulfill both an
adjudicative and a political role—adjudicative insofar as the
collective decision of the jury in fact resolves the case, and political
insofar as the jurors’ deliberations across demographic and attitudi-
nal boundaries to reach a common consensus on a just outcome is
itself political.62 Second-order diversity, in which variation among
case outcomes results from permitting minorities to be numerically
dominant on juries in accordance with laws of probability, divorces
the jury’s legal and political roles and consequently undermines
both, according to Abramson.63
Valerie Hans and Herbert Kritzer, Guangya Liu, and Neil Vidmar
focus their attention on explaining the factors that produce
59. Id. at 918.
60. Id. at 892-97.
61. Jeffrey Abramson, Second-Order Diversity Revisited, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 739
(2014). But see Heather Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1101 (2005);
Foreword, Federalism: All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2010); Heather Gerken, Cutler
Lecture: Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549 (2011).
62. Abramson, supra note 61, at 802.
63. Id. at 783.
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variation in jury damage awards.64 Kritzer, Liu, and Vidmar
examine archival data from a variety of sources to investigate jury
decision making in the context of noncompensatory damages.65
Many critics point to the apparent variability in noncompensatory
awards as evidence of the need for legal mechanisms such as
statutory caps to control that variability, often referring to “run-
away juries.” As a starting point, they first describe the great range
of injuries that are generally classified as noncompensatory and
suggest that some types of injuries (e.g., pain and suffering) may be
more easily related to the severity of the injury while other types
(e.g., disfigurement, emotional distress, loss of consortium) may be
more related to specific case-related factors.66 
After controlling for factors such as injury severity, gender, and
age, they find that as the size of compensatory damage awards
increases, both the ratio of compensatory to noncompensatory
damages and the variability in ratios decreases.67 Those ratios
differ, however, based on the origin of the data and type of case.68
They also examine the impact of statutory caps on noncompensatory
damage awards in medical malpractice cases and find that the
relationship between compensatory and noncompensatory damages
is weaker for cases involving higher compensatory awards in
jurisdictions with caps.69
Hans contends that damage awards are deeply intertwined with
community values, responding in part to prior work from one of us,70
and offers a model to describe how civil juries translate normative
values into monetary awards.71 Under that model, jurors first make
a categorical determination of whether a damage award is merited
or not. If an award is merited, jurors then make an ordinal assess-
ment of whether the damage award should be large or small.
Finally, they translate the ordinal assessment into a precise
64. Herbert Kritzer, Guangya Liu & Neil Vidmar, An Exploration of “Noneconomic”
Damages in Civil Jury Awards, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 971 (2014).
65. Id. at 986-90.
66. Id. at 976-80.
67. Id. at 1010.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1011.
70. Jason Solomon, The Political Puzzle of the Civil Jury, 61 EMORY L.J. 1331 (2012). 
71. Valerie P. Hans, What’s It Worth? Jury Damage Awards As Community Judgments,
55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 935 (2014).
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monetary value.72 Community values inform each of those steps. But
she also cautions that a number of institutional and procedural
constraints hamper the ability of juries to fully reflect community
values in damage awards.73 She concludes that while models of jury
decision making on damage awards do not necessarily produce
precise estimates, their inherent variability suggests the impact of
community values.74
How do these “community values” emerge from the jury? Chris-
tina Carbone and Victoria Plaut echo William Nelson’s comments
that civil juries are better able than judges to decide cases in ways
that will be perceived as fair by community standards, but argue
that it is the diverse composition of the jury that inspires confidence
rather than any superior decision-making capacity.75 Diversity
encourages robust deliberation and requires consensus-building
around common views of justice in spite of different attitudes, life
experiences, and viewpoints.76
Public confidence in the legitimacy of the verdict, however, might
depend on whether the public views the civil jury through colorblind
or multicultural lenses. In communities wedded to a colorblind
model, diversity should not dictate case outcomes, according to
Carbone and Plaut, and thus verdicts rendered by nondiverse juries
do not undermine their own legitimacy.77 Communities that value
a multicultural approach recognize the United States as a pluralist
society and value diversity for its contribution to a functioning
democracy.78 For these communities, verdicts by nondiverse juries
are the result of an unfair process and are viewed with greater
skepticism.79
To the extent that we rely on jurors to reliably inject community
values into the legal system, though, Ilya Somin sounds a caution-
ary if mixed note.80 Building on his work on the political ignorance
72. Id. at 944.
73. Id. at 963-68.
74. Id. at 968.
75. Christina S. Carbone & Victoria C. Plaut, Diversity and the Civil Jury, 55 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 837 (2014).
76. Id. at 875.
77. Id. at 852-53.
78. Id. at 853-54.
79. Id. at 854.
80. Ilya Somin, Jury Ignorance and Political Ignorance, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1167
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of voters, Somin casts doubt on the idea that jurors are sufficiently
knowledgeable to properly adjudicate civil cases.81 But Somin also
points out that to the extent we look to both jury service and voting
as means of lay people participating in governance, citizens may do
a better job of serving as jurors than of either voting or providing
input into policy choices more directly.82 Somin points out that
jurors’ limited knowledge and time is better suited for sitting for a
few days and deciding a particular case, with competing evidence
presented to them, as compared to voting, when citizens are not
obligated to consider any evidence at all.83
D. Implications
What might we take away from this Symposium? One implication
is the interdependence of the historical, interpretive, theoretical,
and empirical inquiries—all represented here. If we understand the
historical context in which the jury was seen as a political institu-
tion, as Nelson and Thomas help us understand, we can make
arguments about whether the historical justification still carries
weight. History also helps the interpretive exercise of giving
meaning to our current practices, as Amar and Burns do. And then
that interpretive exercise can lead to a more theoretical take on the
role of individual jurors, or juries more broadly, in our democratic
order. This is the kind of exercise that Abramson, Leib, Landsman,
and Lahav in different ways are engaged in. Finally, with a firmer
grasp of the role of juries, we can ask empirical questions about how
this role is fulfilled, shown in the work of Hans; Kritzer, Liu, and
Vidmar; Diamond, Rose and Murphy; and Somin.
Another implication is the need to engage with democratic theory
in both understanding—and making arguments about how to
improve—the functioning of the jury as a political institution. If one
sees the civil jury as an instantiation of pluralist democracy, then
one must forego the importance of diversity of perspectives on
individual juries, as Carbone and Plaut (and to a certain extent
Diamond and Rose) emphasize, or on juries in the aggregate, as
(2014).
81. Id. at 1181-88.
82. Id. at 1193.
83. Id. at 1189.
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Hans and Gerken do. But if one sees the civil jury as a site for
deliberative democracy, as Abramson and Leib do, then one might
see the the role of the juror differently. One might even instruct the
jury differently depending on which perspective one adopts. Should
individual jurors draw on their life experiences during deliberation?
The choice between pluralist and deliberative democracy might help
determine the answer to this question.
And finally, understanding and navigating the tension between
legal and political (or justice) values might go a long way in
understanding different perspectives on the importance and efficacy
of the civil jury. The argument between Jeffrey Abramson and
Heather Gerken, and to a lesser extent Valerie Hans and one of us
(Solomon), is about this tension, and the appropriate normative
stance towards elevating political or justice values over legal values
in deciding a particular case. For Gerken and Hans, the jury is
performing an appropriate and useful function in injecting commu-
nity values, even if it means elevating them over the “law of rules.”
Abramson and Solomon are more concerned about the harm to rule-
of-law values.
Most, if not all, Symposium participants seem to agree that much
theoretical and empirical work remains to be done on this topic of
the civil jury as a political institution. We hope that this Symposium
made a modest contribution and served as a useful jump-start to
such an effort.
